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RECENT DECISIONS
The difficulty which Justice Dietrich, in his dissenting opinion in
the Willenson case, finds is in the placement of an affirmative duty upon
the attorney to make the independence of the operation apparent to the
general public. He would prefer that it be incumbent upon one chal-
lenging the arrangement at least to allege 'that the operations are not
in fact independent. 15 However, it does not appear to this author that the
burden placed upon the attorney is too great in light of the public in-
terest which is to be protected.
In the Willenson case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court laid down
definite requirements which must be observed by an attorney who
wishes to engage in an independent business or share an office with a
nonprofessional. Adherence to the Canons of Ethics regarding adver-
tising is of primary importance. Further, the attorney has a duty to
make an obvious physical separation of the nonlegal business from the
legal business. Future conduct of the type involved in this case will not
be tolerated and it is evident that the court will continue to regulate the
professional conduct of attorneys very strictly.
COLLEEN A. RoAcH
Domestic Relations: The Present Law on Artificial Insemination
-Few topics have engendered such great controversy in the past years
as that of artificial insemination (hereinafter called AI). The social,
moral,' religious, and legal problems raised by this relatively new medi-
cal technique defy treatment in a single article; in fact, the very inter-
relationship of these disciplines has so complicated this topic that a
veritable paralysis has resulted in the law concerning AI. Yet, the legal
profession cannot close its eyes to the serious nature of this problem.
AI cannot be treated as a passing fad performed upon some insistent
childless women as an experiment of sorts. Statistics on AI are at best
conjecture because of the secrecy involved in its administration; how-
ever, some have estimated that approximately 100,000 American fami-
lies have had children through the AI procedure and all seem to agree
that its use will increase.2 Thus, an examination of the present status
of the law and possible future legislation on AI seems in order. It is
this author's position that AI should be examined and analyzed from a
public policy viewpoint, placed in the general setting of Judeo-Christian
morality which prevails in our American society, yet divorced as much
as possible from the detailed religious problems involved.
The method used to effect artificial insemination is of vital legal
significance. There are three types of AI used by physicians to im-
15 Id. at 529, 123 N.W. 2d at 458.
1 For an excellent discussion of the sociological, religious, and ethical aspects
of artificial insemination see Rice, A.ID.--An Heir to Controversy, 34 NoT
DAME LAW. 510 (1959).
2 Weinberger, A Partial Solution to Legiiimacy Problems Arising From the
Use of Artificial Insemination, 35 IND. L. J. 143 (1960).
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pregnate a woman. When the sperm count of the husband is high enough
to indicate fertility and failure to conceive is due either to the hus-
band's physical or psychological inability to effect intercourse, or due
to some structural defect in the wife's anatomy, the semen to be used
will be taken from the husband. This procedure is called artificial in-
semination homologous (hereinafter called AIH) and is virtually free
of legal problems.3 The only question arising under AIH is whether
it is such a consummation of a marriage as to bar an action for annul-
ment by the wife on grounds of the husband's impotency.4 When the
sperm count of the husband indicates a low fertility potential one of
two techniques are available. The sperm of a third party donor may
be used exclusively. This process js known as artificial insemination
heterologous (hereinafter called AID). Another alternative available
is to mix the sperm of a third party known to be fertile with that of
the husband and to use the resulting fluid. This technique is called
combination artificial insemination (hereinafter called CAI), and even
though this process has little medical significance (outside of bolstering
the ego of the husband by giving him a sense of participation), it may,
as will become apparent later in our discussion of legitimacy, have
important legal ramifications. AID and CAI have opened a Pandora's
box of legal problems because it must be assumed that the biological
father is not the husband of the offspring's mother, and yet, there has
been no act of illicit intercourse.
Attention, thus, must be focused on the most serious problem con-
cerning artificial insemination-does it constitute adultery? In discuss-
ing this question, the possibility must be examined that courts might
afford different treatment to adultery as a criminal offense and adultery
as grounds for a divorce action. To the author's knowledge there has
been no attempt to prosecute AID on grounds of criminal adultery in
this country.5 The question of AID as adultery has, however, been
raised several times in divorce actions. The first judicial pronouncement
came in the case of Orford v. Orford.6 The suit dealt with the wife's
demand for alimony in a divorce action; the husband basing his defense
on the wife's committing adultery by AID without his consent. The
court found that there had in fact been "real" not "artificial" adultery
and in lengthy dicta pronounced AID as "a monstrous act of adultery."
3 The moral problems concerning the method of obtaining the semen from the
husband is a matter to be determined by the religious authorities of the various
faiths. There is a wide divergence between Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant
views on the method to be used.
4 In 1949, an English case held that conception and birth of a child by AIH
would not prevent the wife from seeking an annulment of the marriage on
grounds of the husband's impotency. R.E.L. v. E.L. [19491; 1 All E.R. 141.
5 In 1959, an Italian Court held that AID without the husband's consent con-
stituted criminal adultery. In re Carla Casarotti Faedda, N.Y. Times, Feb. 17,
1959, p. 8.
649 Ont. L.R. 15, 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
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The court defined adultery anew in the following manner:
The essence of the offense of adultery consists, not in the moral
turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in the voluntary
surrender to another person of the reproductive powers or facul-
ties of the guilty person; and any submission of these powers to
the service or enjoyment of any person other than the husband
or the wife comes within the definition of adultery.7
The first American case to deal with this problem on facts similar
to the Orford case was Hoch v. Hoch." There the court held that even
without the consent of the husband AID was not adultery. Again this
pronouncement was dicta because the court found that there had in
fact been "real" adultery. In 1954, the Superior Court of Cook County,
Illinois, in the case of Doornbos v. Doornbos,1 granted a decree of
divorce on grounds of adultery declaring that AID with or without
the husband's consent was adultery. There is no way to reconcile
Doornbos with Hoch.
The difficulty in part in this area is that no court having final appel-
late jurisdiction has passed on the question of whether or not AID
constitutes adultery. However, most authorities agree that in order to
hold AID to be adultery one would have to stretch both the common
law and statutory definitions of adultery beyond reason. At common
law for adultery to have been committed, actual sexual intercourse
must have taken place with actual penetration of the male organ into
the body of the female.10 It would seem impossible to bring AID within
this definition. Although adultery as a criminal offense is purely statu-
tory, it often must fall back on the common law for the precise defini-
tion of what constitutes adultery." In a state where the term is defined
in the statutes, one element always includes "sexual intercourse," and
the accepted definition of sexual intercourse again requires actual con-
tact and penetration between the sexual organs of the male and fe-
male. The strict and narrow interpretation of criminal statutes would
almost certainly preclude interpreting AID as adultery,
It seems evident that the holding of the court in the Orford2 case,
that the surrendering of the reproductive organs to another constitutes
the crime of adultery rather than an act of moral turpitude, simply is
not in line with the accepted concept of adultery. If the Orford defini-
tion were accepted, innumerable problems would arise. Would the third
party donor as well as the wife be guilty of adultery? What would be
the criminal liability of the administering physician (three party adult-
7Id., 58 D.L.R. 251, 258.8 Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County II (1948); see Chicago Sun, Feb. 10,
1945, p. 13, col. 3; Time, Feb. 26, 1945, p. 58.
0 23 U.S.L. WEEK 2308 p. 16 (Ill. Dec. 13, 1954).
10 1 Am. Jux. Adultery §9, (1936).
11 1 AM. JUR. Adultery §34 (1936).
12 Note 6 supra.
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ery) ? If the sperm of a donor from a sperm bank is used and the donor
has died are we to say that adultery was committed with a dead man?
To ask these questions is to answer them, and it becomes clear that to
treat AID as criminal adultery would result in ludicrous and illogical
decisions.
Although courts have held that even in divorce actions adultery
must consist of actual sexual intercourse,1 it is possible that a liberal
court might interpret AID as adultery in such a situation.14 Since no
criminal prosecution is involved, the courts need not be hampered by
strict construction of statutes. Furthermore, since one of the very
reasons adultery is grounds for divorce is the possibility that a bastard
child may be made the heir of the husband, a court might be willing
to find that AID, having the same effect, is also grounds for divorce,
especially when the husband has, not consented to the insemination. One
is thus left to conjecture as to how the courts will deal with this ques-
tion, and it can only be pointed out that because the classical definition
of adultery has required actual physical connection, the probabilities
are against a holding of AID as adultery in both criminal and divorce
actions.
Related to the problem of adultery, but not governed by its de-
termination, is the question of the legitimacy of the child conceived
through AID. To be sure, if AID is held to be adultery the child result-
ing is illegitimate, as we established in the Doornbos'5 case. But, even
if AID is found not to be adultery, the child may still be found to be
illegitimate, since the natural father was not married to the mother be-
fore or after the conception by AID. In Strnad v. Strnad16 the husband
was seeking visitation rights to a child born as a result of AID. The
New York court held that:
(1) the child was potentially adopted or semi-adopted by the husband,
(2) the child was legitimate, and
(3) the situation did not differ from the case of a child born out of
wedlock, who is by law made legitimate upon the marriage of the
interested parties.
This decision was seized upon by the proponents of artificial insemina-
tion as a final solution to the sensitive problem of legitimacy. The diffi-
culty with the Strnad case is that it did not have a legal leg to stand on
and was the attempt of a well meaning court to deal with a complex topic
'3 Johnson v. Johnson, 78 N.J. Eq. 507, 80 At]. 119 (1911) ; In Russel v. Russel,however, an English court stated in dictum that a wife who had been im-
pregnated by a paramour (not AI), had committed adultery even if there had
been no sexual intercourse. 11924] p. 61 A.M. 689, 720.14 Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for Effective
Counseling, 39 N.C.L. REv. 217, 234 (1961).15 Note 7 supra.
16 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
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in a cursory and evasive fashion. The recent case of Gursky v. Gurskys7
should lay to a final rest the fallacious reasoning of the Strnad case.
In the Gursky case, the husband in a separation action refused to pay
for the support of a child, conceived by his wife through AID, though
he had given his consent. The court found that there was no basis in
law to hold the child legitimate since the husband was not the natural
father of the child. As to the theory of semi-adoption raised by the
Strnad case, the court pointed out that adoption was a statutory pro-
cedure and that no court could "imply" adoption to meet an exigent
circumstance. Finally, it seems that the comparison made between AID
and the case of a child, born out of wedlock and subsequently made
legitimate upon the marriage of the interested parties, is false and mis-
leading. In the latter case the natural parents marry and the child is
as a result made legitimate, but in AID the husband is not the natural
parent and calling him an interested party in the action does not add
legal significance. In .Gursky the court did find the husband liable for
support since his consent to AID was held to equitably estop him from
denying support. It thus seems that in absence of legislation or formal
adoption the child must be held to be illegitimate.
Heretofore, in the discussion of legitimacy it has been presumed
that the child is in fact not that of the husband and is therefore il-
legitimate. Practically, this may be a very difficult matter to prove be-
cause of the strong presumption the courts give to the legitimacy of a
child born in wedlock."' In fact, legitimacy is often defined as the state
of being born in lawful marriage,19 while illegitimacy is defined as the
status of a child born of parents not legally married at the time of
birth.2° It seems doubtful that this presumption could be overcome by
merely proving that the husband had a low fertility potential, since this
would only show that it was unlikely that the husband was the natural
father and not that it was impossible for him to father the child. That
this possibility would seem to suffice to legitimize the child is evident
from cases which hold that even if the mother had been living in open
adultery with another man the child is legitimate if the husband had
access to the wife at the time of gestation. In Matter of Findlay, Chief
Justice Cardozo expressed the rule clearly:
If husband and wife are living together in the conjugal relation,
legitimacy will be presumed, though the wife harbored an adult-
erer .... It may even be presumed though the spouses are living
apart if there is a fair basis for the belief that at times they may
have come together.2 '
17 242 N.Y.S. 2d 406 (1963).
18 Eldridge v. Eldridge, 153 Fla. 873, 16 So. 2d 163 (1944).
19 IBLAcKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 446 (Christian ed. 1878).
20 Id. at 454.
21253 N.Y. 1, 8, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (1930).
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Furthermore, one can only guess whether the courts will accept into
evidence the results of sterility tests, and if they do, whether they will
be held to be conclusive on the matter.'2 Because of this strong pre-
sumption favoring legitimacy, one author has suggested that doctors
use the CAI method and document the fact that the husband was not
absolutely sterile.23
According to the courts that find the child illegitimate the question
arises-is there any way to legitimize the child? The procedure of
adoption should be available to the husband but because adoption
statutes do not contemplate AID they may not provide the answer.
The problem arises from the fact that statutes generally provide for
adoption by persons other than the parents, or by a spouse to whom
one of the parents was married after the birth of the child.24 In these
jurisdictions it is obvious that statutory law should be modified to allow
for adoption of an AID child in absence of other legislation concerning
artificial insemination.
It should be pointed out that litigation on the topic of AI has been
rare. This has resulted both because of the secrecy involved, and the
difficulty in proving the child illegitimate due to the presumption of
legitimacy previously discussed. We have no public records which in-
dicate whether or not a child is a product of AL. To promote secrecy
and save themselves harmless from prosecution for falsification of
public records, many doctors who perform AID will send the patient
to another doctor for the delivery of the child. Such doctor, being un-
aware of the method used to impregnate the woman, will thus innocently
register the woman's husband as the natural father on the birth cer-
tificate.
Another problem, which grows out of the fact that there is such
complete secrecy in the administration of AID, is found in the possi-
bility of future incestuous relationships between offspring of the same
biological father. Although, it is true that to some degree this problem
exists in the case of adoption, it is even more aggravated in AID be-
cause the donors, as a general rule, are from a limited group (e.g.
medical students are the most prolific donors), and multiple insemina-
tions may be made from the sperm of one donor. Whether society con-
siders this problem to be significant can only be answered by legislation
on the subject.
It is the author's view that society should take a mature look at
the process of AL. It will be impossible to get a unanimous stand as to
its propriety because of the strongly differing religious views concerning
AL. Without in any way intending to pass judgment on the differing
2236 TUL. L. REv. 347 (1961).
23 Note 2 supra.
24It appears that WIs. STAT. §48.82 (1961) is broad enough in scope to allow
for adoption of an AID child.
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religious positions, it seems that nothing is to be gained by ignoring
the legal aspects of A. They should be met head on. It is probable that
those who believe AID to be adultery would support legislation making
it a criminal act, but the probability of this viewpoint prevailing in
legislation seems dim. It would appear that the only way to deal with
AID would be to legislate the symptoms and not the disease. To de-
clare the child legitimate has the effect of declaring public policy in
support of AID. The words "legitimate" and "illegitimate" have taken
on moral coloration over and above their legal connotation. In the
Gursky caseI 5 the court solved the problem by declaring that equitable
estoppel would prevent the husband from denying the responsibility
of supporting the child when he consented to AID. The next logical
step would be for legislatures to limit themselves in giving legitimate
status to the child by stating that the responsibility of the husband to
the child will be "as if the child were legitimate." This would in effect
protect the child somewhat while not involving the state in sensitive
moral issues to any great degree. To date all attempts to legislate on
this subject have failed,28 and since no great public pressure is avail-
able, one wonders if legislation will come at all. A New York City
municipal code section provides for proper examination of sperm
donors. This code section has put New York City in the ridiculous
position of legislating the production of illegitimate children. One can
only hope that legislatures will take a definite stand on AL.
CONCLUSION
The present status of the law seems to preclude any holding that
AID is adultery in either criminal or divorce proceedings. The child,
if proven beyond doubt to be the product of AID is illegitimate. The
rationale of the Strnad case seems to be clearly refuted. Legislation
on Al is conspicuous by its absence and no future attempt to legislate
is imminent. It is clear that should legislation be adopted the state should
not adopt a particular moral or religious position but should concern
itself only with the practical effects on public policy. This would protect
the child and give him right similar to that of a legitimate child.
AARON D. TwERSKI
25 Note 17 supra.
2 Legislation has been introduced in New York, Virginia, Wisconsin, Indiana,
Minnesota, and Ohio.
27 NEv YORK CITY SANITARY CODE §112.

